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Abstract 
School districts in Ohio have the option of diversifying their revenue base by adopting 
income taxes. Using a panel of Ohio school districts that adopted a local income tax from 
1990 to 2008, we find that revenues are pro-cyclical and fluctuate only mildly. The estimated 
short- and long-run income elasticity of school district income tax revenues is 1.05 and 1.04, 
respectively. We also find that the school district tax base fully adjusts to its long-run 
equilibrium within two years. Finally, we show that school district income tax adoption does 
not provide more stability to total school district tax revenues in the short-run or the long-run. 
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1 Introduction 
The school district income tax is a special tax earmarked for providing financial support to a 
local school district. As of January 2015, school districts in Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, 
and Pennsylvania can levy income taxes. Given the reliance of K-12 financing on local taxes, 
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the cyclicality of local tax revenues is an important policy concern.1 School districts need to 
ensure that revenues from a tax base can meet the increased constituent demands coming 
from rising incomes. This trade-off between growth and variability goes back to the seminal 
work of Groves and Kahn (1952). 
From a policy perspective, the effect of tax base diversification (through the enactment of a 
school district income tax) on total local tax revenue growth is of great interest. On the one 
hand, school district income taxes directly increase total local tax revenue for schools. There 
is evidence, however, that school districts use income taxes to substitute away from property 
taxes, leading to a reduction in total local tax revenue (Ross and Nguyen-Hoang, 2013). The 
net effect of school district income tax adoption on total local tax revenue is thus an open 
empirical question. 
Similarly, tax base diversification might affect the variability of local tax revenues, which is 
also of importance to policymakers given the need to negotiate multi-year teacher contracts. 
One of the arguments often given in favor of the property tax for local governments is that it 
is a stable source of revenue due to its inelasticity and lagged incidence (Alm, 2013). Alm et 
al. (2011) find that local government reliance on the property tax was an advantage in dealing 
with the Great Recession. In many states, including Ohio, much of local government own-
source revenues are voted upon as an amount, not a rate. While a millage rate will be listed at 
the time of voting, it can be adjusted upwards in the case of a decline in assessed valuation in 
order achieve the voted upon amount of revenue (Ross and Hummel, 2012). In practice, this 
tends to mean that revenues from property taxation are very stable over the business cycle. 
Property taxes being levied as an amount, not a rate, also means that school districts cannot 
automatically capture the upside of housing appreciation through the property tax. Instead, 
school officials have to return to the voters and ask for additional revenue. The income tax, 
however, is levied as a rate and school districts therefore should be able to automatically 
increase revenues during times of growth, reducing the need for additional levies just to keep 
up with inflation.2 The potential downside of diversification would be if income tax revenue 
craters when the economy is in a recession. Thus, it is important to examine whether the 
adoption of a school-district income tax would make total local tax revenues more pro-
                                                            
1  K-12 education in the U.S. is funded with a combination of federal, state, and local funds. As of 2013, federal 
sources account for only 9.1% whereas state revenue sources contribute 45.6% (30.8% as general formula 
assistance) and 45.3% (38.9% from taxes and parental contributions), respectively (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). 
School districts need revenues from a tax base to meet the increased constituent demands that come with 
rising incomes. Locally-sourced school finance revenues totaled US$270.6 billions. The majority (US$184.4 
billions) was due to taxes of which US$176.1 billions came from property taxation alone. An additional US$8.3 
billion came from other local taxes; namely, the school district income tax. 
2  It should be noted that so-called “levy fatigue” is primarily a concern of school officials, not citizen-voters. 
For more on levy fatigue in the Ohio context, see Johnson and Ingle (2009) and Ingle et al. (2013). 
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cyclical and, thus, more susceptible to shortfalls during recessions. Likewise, from a local 
policymaker perspective, if school district income tax revenues grow more reliably than 
property tax revenues, the benefit may outweigh any short-run volatility. 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the first measure of growth and variability of school 
district income tax revenues with respect to the business cycle. In addition, it examines the 
impact of the introduction of a school district income tax on the growth and variability of 
total local tax revenues for education financing in Ohio from 1990 through 2008. We estimate 
the impact of tax base diversification on the cyclicality of total local tax revenues to assess 
whether school district income tax adoption was a good idea for stabilizing school financing. 
First, we use a reduced form approach to estimate long- and short-run income elasticity via a 
log-log specification. Our long-run estimate is based on a Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares 
(DOLS) model whereas the short-run one is obtained from an Error Correction Model 
(ECM). Next, we employ a Difference-in-Differences (DID) design to estimate the 
incremental effect of the introduction of school district income taxes on the growth and 
variability of total local tax revenues in each school district. To overcome the potentially 
endogenous decision to enact a school district income tax, we match adopting school districts 
to non-adopting ones based on recorded motivations for these decisions. Using both the 
matched and unmatched samples, we examine whether the combination of school district 
income tax and property tax revenues is more stable in the long- and short-run relative to 
property tax revenues alone. 
The contribution of this work is twofold. First, we provide the first short- and long-run 
revenue income elasticity estimates regarding the school district income tax in the literature. 
Second, we add to the empirical literature that examines the interaction of school districts 
income tax and property tax revenues by distinguishing between short- and long-run effects. 
In line with Ross and Nguyen-Hoang (2013), we find evidence of substitutability between 
property tax and school district income tax revenue. We additionally show that this finding 
does not differ in the short-run relative to the long-run. Our findings offer useful insights for 
school districts debating whether to diversify their tax base by introducing an income tax. 
They indicate that school districts cannot rely on income taxes to foster local tax revenue 
stability. Our results also help to inform the decision of state policymakers to allow local 
governments such as school districts to tax income, as the Ohio legislature first did in 1981. 
Using conventional methods in the public finance literature, we find that revenue from Ohio’s 
school district income tax fluctuates mildly and pro-cyclically. Overall, we find that school 
district income tax revenue growth exceeded economic growth in Ohio from 1990 through 
2008. The estimated short- and long-run income elasticities of school district income tax 
revenues are 1.05 and 1.04, respectively. Our DID findings suggest that income taxes do not 
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affect short-run total tax revenue variability and long-run total tax revenue growth in a 
significant way. Therefore, our results could be interpreted as evidence that school district 
income taxes cannot have a tax revenue-stabilizing role in the long- or the short-run. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the necessary institutional 
background regarding school district income taxes and local taxation in Ohio; namely, 
property and school district income taxes. It also includes a review of the empirical literature 
on the determinants of school district income tax adoption, with a particular focus on Ohio. 
Section 3 discusses the data and methodology and Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 
concludes. 
2 Institutional Background 
Local Tax Bases in Ohio: Property Taxes 
As in other states, the property tax is the most important source of funding for Ohio’s 
schools. Approximately two-thirds of all property taxes levied in Ohio were directed to K-12 
education financing, making up about 80% of total own-source revenues for local school 
districts. Property taxes are categorized as real property taxes (on land and buildings) which 
account for 68% of all property taxes and tangible personal property taxes (on machinery, 
equipment, furniture, fixtures, and inventories) which represent a mere 8.7%. They are 
determined based on the property’s true value and the application of a specified percentage 
(assessment rate) to that value that may differ by type of property. The Ohio constitution 
restricts the taxing authority authority (i.e. county, city, township, school district, special 
district, etc.) from imposing new taxes without voter approval up to 10 mills, a tax rate 
equivalent to 1% of the true value of the property. Voters may authorize levies exceeding this 
limit by election only. These levies are then subject to tax reduction factors, which restrict the 
growth (decline) in taxes due to valuation increases (decreases) that occur after reappraisal or 
triennial updates.3 The effective tax rate cannot be lowered below 20 mills. Property tax relief 
on real property taxes is available through three credit programs: the homestead exemption, 
the 10% rollback credit and the 2.5 percent rollback credit (Sullivan and Sobul, 2010). 
Local Tax Bases in Ohio: School District Income Taxes 
School district income taxes in Ohio were first introduced in 1981. The law was repealed in 
1983 but re-enacted in 1989. The five school districts that adopted a school district income 
tax before 1983 were grandfathered to be allowed to continue to levy a school district income 
tax.4 Ohio school districts uniquely levy the income tax solely subject to voter approval, 
                                                            
3  Applicable only to real property taxes. 
4  These school districts are Bradford EVSD, Anna LSD, West Liberty Salem LSD, Arlington LSD and McComb LSD. 
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specifying if property taxes are to be reduced (levy and amount of gross millage to be 
reduced) as compensation for increased income taxes.5 However, the reasons stated by 
policymakers for adoption of a school district income tax are often unclear or in conflict. For 
example, while income tax levies are often put on the ballot together with reductions in the 
property tax, they are often touted as a complementary way to raise revenue to meet rising 
school expenditures (Miko, 2006). It is therefore unclear whether total local school tax 
revenue increases in the event of income tax adoption. In the paper closest to our own, Ross 
and Nguyen-Hoang (2013) examine the effect of income tax adoption on operating property 
tax revenue. Using annual panel data from 1990 to 2008, they find that about one quarter of 
additional revenue from the school district income tax is used to offset property taxes in the 
short-run, with the remaining being net new revenue. This finding should be interpreted as 
evidence of substitutability that our findings confirm as well. Our analysis adds to the prior 
knowledge by distinguishing the long- and short-run effects of the introduction of school 
district income tax on total tax revenues (Ohio Department of Taxation, 2013). 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of school district income taxes from 1990 through 2014 in 
terms of number of adopting school districts and average rates levied. Clearly, the number of 
school district that adopted income taxes grew substantially in the early 1990s. Only 22 
school districts had enacted an income tax in 1990, a figure that rose up to 179 by 2008 and 
197 by 2014. School district income tax rates varied from an average of 0.79% in 1990 to 
1.02% in 2008 and 1.09% in 2014. 
In recent years, there have been a number of legislative actions that significantly altered the 
operation of local taxation in Ohio. House Bill 66 of the 2006-2007 state biennial budget 
permitted school districts to levy, subject to voter approval, an“earned income” school district 
tax, an alternate tax base that includes only earned income and self-employment income of 
the residents of the school district.6 House Bill 66 introduced a phase-out of all tangible 
property taxes but also created reimbursement mechanisms to fully hold school districts 
harmless through FY 2011. Following changes in House Bill 119, of the 2008-2009 state 
biennial budget, tax year 2008 was the final year business tangible property was generally 
                                                            
5  The net effect of a millage reduction on real property taxes could be negligible for school districts with 
effective rates at or near 20 mills. 
6  The earned income tax base excludes all other types of income that would be taxable under the traditional 
income tax base such as interest, dividends, capital gains, or pensions, rental income, lottery winnings, and 
income earned by estates. Finally, the earned income base does not permit personal exemptions that are 
allowed under the traditional tax base or adjustments to income such as IRA contributions, self-employment 
health insurance deductions, and alimony payments (Ohio Department of Taxation, 2013). One could think of 
the earned income tax base as endogenous since it is determined based on voter approval. Since the earned 
income base is smaller, however, this makes our estimates more conservative. More importantly, this 
endogeneity is not likely to drive our overall results given that the earned income base is a significant part of 
the total income base and 1.5% of our sample utilizes the earned income base. 
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taxable. Finally, House Bill 1 of the 2010-2011 state biennial budget extended the state’s full 
reimbursement of school districts for their foregone tax revenues due to the phase-out of all 
tangible property through 2013. 
Due to the substantial changes in school district revenue administration with regards to 
collection and reimbursement that peaked in 2009, we restrict our analysis to the years 1990-
2008. In doing so, we avoid contaminating our estimates of growth and variability from 
amendments that introduced automatic stabilizers to school district tax revenues as part of 
House Bill 1. Including post-2008 years in our analysis would confound our analysis because 
the policies implemented during those years aimed to lessen the impact of the tangible 
property tax revenue phase-outs. Ohio moved to phase-out local tangible (business) personal 
property taxation in 2009. As a result, our baseline estimates of the true relative impact of 
school district income taxes on total local tax revenue growth and variability would suffer 
from downwards bias in the inclusion of post-2008 years. In addition, the Great Recession 
had a fundamental institutional impact on local jurisdictions that adversely affected their 
fiscal health, making the excluded years clearly an outlier period. At the same time, it offers a 
unique opportunity to test the resilience of school district income tax revenue in a steep 
recession. Thus, we offer a supplementary set of results in Tables A.1 and A.2 of Appendix 
over an extended period with post-2008 information through 2015. Thus, our analysis also 
covers the Great Recession’s full effect on property values and average income in Ohio. 
3 Empirical Approach 
3.1 Data 
The main two outcomes of interest are school district income tax revenues per pupil and total 
school district tax revenues per pupil. The latter are defined as school district income tax and 
total property tax revenues per pupil which, in turn, is the sum of real property taxes charged 
per pupil and tangible property taxes levied per pupil. For brevity, we drop the per pupil 
denomination throughout our analysis, but we urge the reader to recall that revenue measures 
are not totals but normalized by the school district pupil population. The key independent 
variable that measures income is the average adjusted gross federal income in the school 
district, normalized by the 2005 price level. All tax-related (school district income tax and 
property tax) information is from the Ohio Department of Taxation. Information on the levels 
of state and federal aid per pupil, average daily membership of pupils in each school district 
are extracted from publications of the Ohio Department of Education. The tax price (defined 
as the ratio of median housing price to total residential property values per pupil), the 
percentages of renters and seniors and the average school district income tax rate in 
surrounding school districts were generously made available by Ross and Nguyen-Hoang 
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(2013). Table 1 provides summary statistics of all the variables used in our analysis by school 
district income tax adoption status. We split the sample into a subsample of 2,253 school 
district year observations in which a school district income tax was adopted and a subsample 
of 9,318 observations of school districts in years when no school district income tax was in 
place. 
3.2 Reduced-Form Short- and Long-Run Elasticity Models 
Groves and Kahn (1952) were the first to estimate the income elasticity of state and local tax 
revenues by specifying a log-log regression. Fox and Campbell (1984) question the validity 
of Groves and Kahn’s approach for explaining short-run revenue stability because it employs 
long-run measures. Fox and Campbell (1984) focus on short-run revenue fluctuations over 
the business cycle; a stable tax is less responsive to fluctuations. Similarly, Sobel and 
Holcombe (1996) distinguish between long- and short-run relationships due to the non-
stationarity of income and tax bases (trending upwards over time). Specifically, the authors 
use non-stationary variables for the estimation of the long-run relationship via a levels 
regression and stationary variants (e.g. differenced) by omitting the time trend to recover the 
short-run income elasticity. Bruce et al. (2006) introduce Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares 
(DOLS) and Error Correction Models (ECM) for the estimation of long- and short-run 
elasticity estimates. Their approach also distinguishes between short-run elasticities and 
speed of adjustment parameters as well as the symmetry of their responses to changes in 
income. Anderson and Shimul (2016) offer Newer Mean Group (MG) and Pooled Mean 
Group (PMG) estimators of long-run and short-run buoyancy (elasticity measure unadjusted 
for tax rate changes) and resilience based on Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE). The estimators 
offered by Anderson and Shimul (2016) are recommended for dynamic heterogeneous panels 
in setting with a long time-series dimension. Unfortunately, we only have 19 time units to our 
disposal and therefore cannot adopt their approach. 
Instead we follow Bruce et al. (2006) and derive a long-run elasticity estimate using Dynamic 
Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) for co-integrated panel data with homogeneous covariance 
structure (Watson and Stock, 1993; Kao and Chiang, 2000). This single-equation 
cointegration technique is particularly useful when observations are non-stationary because it 
allows us to obtain the cointegration regression between the income tax base and average 
income in the school district. The variability of tax revenues reflects the relationship between 
the school district’s income taxes and its business cycle. For the short-run elasticity, we 
estimate the cyclical component of school district income tax revenues. We take the first-
difference to de-trend lnBit and lnYit in order to obtain the short-run metrics. This 
transformation gives rise to stationary income and school district income tax revenue time-
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series.7 Our baseline short-run elasticity estimates are based on the symmetric error 
correction model (ECM) specified in equation 2. Our specification restricts tax revenues to 
adjust toward the estimated long-term relationship. This permits the estimation of speed of 
adjustment parameters that indicate how fast the school district income tax revenue converges 
to a new equilibrium following changes in average income. The observed change in the 
school district tax revenue is the combination of two effects: (i) change in tax revenues due to 
change in average income; (ii) adjustment to existing disequilibrium. 
Equation (1) gives our baseline long-run income elasticity measure by regressing logged 
school district income tax revenues lnRit on logged average income lnYit in school district i at 
year t.8 The DOLS correction is implemented by introducing j leads and lags of the first 
difference of average school district income. In estimation, this causes the loss of 1 year of 
panel data. We further adjust by an earned income tax base indicator and the school district 
income tax rate. The latter controls for variability due to changes in the school district income 
tax base’s structure over time (Felix, 2008). The parameter of interest is ² 1. This coefficient 
captures the long-run, stable relationship between school district income tax revenue and 
school district average income. It reflects the responsiveness of tax revenues per pupil to 
changes in average income. Estimated over time, it shows how fast school district income tax 
revenue grows in comparison to income. Values greater than unity suggest that tax revenue 
grows faster than income, and slower otherwise. We also specify school district fixed effects 
but omit from the presentation of the model. 
1 2 3 [ ]
j
it it g it g it it it
g j
lnR lnY lnY EI+
=−
= β + γ ∆ +α τ + α + φ∑ 1  (1) 
Tax revenue disequilibria from the long-run value *itlnR  are computed by õ it = lnRit − ² 0 − 
² 1lnRit − ±2Äit − ±31[EIit]. This formulation closely follows Bruce et al. (2006), only adding 
the school district income tax rate and the earned income tax base indicator in calculation. 
We calculate short-run deviations separately for each school district in every year with a 
school district income tax in place by estimating OLS regressions with no leads or lags and 
predicting residuals. Then, we use an indicator variable to denote the existence of a short-run 
                                                            
7  For robustness, we also use the Hodrick-Prescott filter to de-trend the time series and derive the cyclical 
component of the school district income tax revenues. 
8  We examine whether a unit root exists in the logarithms of school district income tax revenues and income, 
using a Fisher-type panel unit root test whose null hypothesis is that all the panels contain a unit root (Choi, 
2001). The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test we employ conducts unit-root tests for each panel individually, 
and then combines the associated p-values to an overall test. To account for any global (all-Ohio) trend the 
observations may exhibit, we include a time trend and subtrack cross-sectional means to mitigate the impact 
of cross-sectional dependence. Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that all panels contain unit roots both in the logarithm of the tax revenue and average income. 
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disequilibrium. In equation (2), we treat short-run disequilibria symmetrically. That is, we do 
not distinguish between positive and negative short-run deviations lnRit from the long-run 
equilibrium tax revenue *itlnR . But, in equation (3) the analysis differentiates between 
symmetric and asymmetric short-run elasticities. This modeling permits us to examine if the 
school district tax revenue responds asymmetrically to changes in institutional factors such as 
education financing needs. We use the indicator 1[Rit−1] to capture the instance of deviations 
above the equilibrium long-run school district income tax revenues value. This allows us to 
assess whether that period’s downward adjustment in revenues to the long-run equilibrium 
value is statistically different from the upward adjustment. We also specify school district 
fixed effects but omit from the presentation of the model. Note that a constant ±0 is also 
included in our estimation but omitted from presentation. 
1 2 1 3 4 1[ ]it it it it it itlnR lnY EI− −= α +α +α τ + α +µ1    (2) 
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 4 1[ ] [ ] [ ]it it it it it it it it it itlnR lnY R lnY R EI− − − − −= α + θ ⋅ + α + θ ⋅ + α τ + α + ν1 1 1      (3) 
Parameter ±1 captures the immediate, intra-period effect of a change in average income. A 
coefficient greater than one shows that tax revenue fluctuates more than income over the 
business cycle. Positive short-run elasticity estimates are expected by theory, suggesting that 
income tax revenue varies pro-cyclically. A negative short-run elasticity would imply 
counter-cyclical school district income tax revenues that increase in recessions and decrease 
in economic booms. The degree of adjustment of the tax revenue to its long-run equilibrium 
value is denoted by the parameter ±2 in Equations (2) and (3). It is interpreted as the 
percentage of disequilibrium removed in every period. Since we introduce a dummy variable 
for the years when school district income tax revenues are above their long-run equilibrium 
value, we capture downward adjustments with the interaction term whereas upwards 
adjustments are represented by the coefficient of the income variable. Thus, the parameter ¸ 1 
indicates whether the short-run downward adjustments in tax revenues are different from the 
upward ones and, similarly, ¸ 2 for the long-run adjustments. To derive the above-equilibrium, 
short-run income elasticity of school district income tax revenue of the asymmetric ECM one 
should sum the coefficients of income and the interaction term of the above equilibrium 
dummy variable and income. Alternatively, when tax revenues are below long-run 
equilibrium the short-run income elasticity can be read directly from the coefficient of 
income. 
3.3 Difference-in-Differences Design 
Next, we focus on the impact of school district income tax adoption on the long- and short-
run income elasticity of total school district tax revenues. However, the fact that the levy and 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
the size of the school district income tax is subject to voter approval makes school district 
income tax adoption an endogenously-determined, choice variable. Indeed, there is extensive 
evidence that school district income tax adoption decisions are not randomly distributed 
throughout the state of Ohio.9 Thus, our empirical strategy should address the underlying 
differences in the determinants of adoption. To minimize the influence of any covariate 
imbalance in school district-level determinants of income tax adoption on our estimates on 
total local tax revenue growth and variability we employ a matching strategy. Clearly, school 
districts who adopt an income tax are different from the ones who do not adopt one on a 
number of observable characteristics. By reducing imbalance in the empirical distribution of 
the pre-treatment characteristics of adopting and non-adopting school districts, we lower the 
degree of model dependence in our estimates which, in turn, decreases inefficiency and bias 
(Ho et al., 2007). 
We estimate the conditional probability of school district income tax adoption based on a 
vector of adoption determinants from 1990 through 2008 (propensity score). We select five 
key determinants of school district income tax adoption based on the findings of the pre-
existing empirical literature on school district income tax adoption Ohio and add two other 
covariates of importance. First, we match on tangible personal property taxes (on machinery, 
equipment, furniture, fixtures, and inventories), classified as public utility tangible or general 
businesses tangible. We expect that this variable should be highly correlated with other 
important factors of adoption such as property taxes on business property (Gill and Haurin, 
2001). Second, we use the average income tax rate among the district’s surrounding 
neighbors as measure of interjurisdictional competition (Spry, 2005; Hall, 2006). Inclusion of 
this covariate also address the spatial dependence in the school district income tax adoption 
(Hall and Ross, 2010). Third, we balance on tax price (Spry, 2005). We additionally match on 
the percentage of revenues from state and federal sources (Hall, 2006). Finally, we control for 
the percentage of the population over age 65 and the percentage of renters. 
We implement 1:1 nearest neighbor matching with replacement based on the estimated 
propensity score. We use the generated matching weights to achieve covariate balance across 
                                                            
9  Gill and Haurin (2001) identify the percentage of business property tax base and percentage of farm 
population and the likelihood of a voter approval of tax levies as the three most important factors of income 
tax base choice. Spry (2005) highlights the roles of interjurisdictional competition (number of school districts 
within 10 miles), the property tax price, and property taxes from business and agricultural property as drivers 
of income tax adoption at the school district level. Hall (2006) confirms the importance of interjurisdictional 
competition in the decision to adopt a school district income tax and adds income inequality, the percentage 
of commercial property, and the percentage of state revenues to the list of key factors. Hall and Ross (2010) 
provide evidence of spatial dependence among school districts when it comes to levying a personal income 
tax. Additionally, they also underline the importance of interjurisdictional competition, the property tax share, 
the income tax share, property taxes on mineral and business property, property taxes on agricultural 
property, and an indicator of the presence of city tax. 
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income tax adopting and non-adopting school districts. Table 2 summarizes the covariate 
imbalance of the matched and unmatched samples. Columns (2) and (3) present the means of 
treated and control school districts. Clearly, pre-processing resulted to a substantially more 
balanced post-matching sample. Columns (4) and (5) show the variance ratio of each 
covariate with values equal to 1 indicating perfect balance. This ratio should equal 1 if there 
is perfect balance. Ratios within [0.5, 0.8) or (1.25, 2]) indicate mediocre balance. Ratios 
even further away from unity are evidence of very poor covariate balance (Ho et al., 2007). 
There are no such instances in our post-matching sample. 
Figure 2 displays a graphical summary of covariate imbalance before and after matching that 
illustrates the gains from matchings. The resulting propensity score leads to a significant 
reduction in standardized percentage bias for all of the determinants of school district income 
tax adoption in Ohio. The most pronounced improvement came for a key determinant, 
interjurisdictional competition. Failing to balance on this covariate would have led to an 
upwards bias that would have overwhelmed the impact of all other determinants. 
We regress logged total school district tax revenues lnTRit on average income lnYit which 
gives rise to a balanced panel. The key independent variable is the interaction of average 
income with the school district-year specific income tax adoption indicator. We also include 
school district fixed effects, the level of the income tax rate and an earned income tax 
indicator as controls in the estimation but omit them from equations (4)-(6). 
1 2 3[ ] [ ]
j
it it it it it g it g it
g j
lnTR lnY IT lnY IT lnY +
=−
= β +β +β ⋅ + γ ∆ + φ∑1 1  (4) 
.
1 2 1 3 4[ ] [ ]it it it it it it itlnTR lnY IT lnY IT−= α +α +α +α ⋅ + µ1 1   (5) 
.
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 4[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]it it it it it it it it it it itlnTR lnY R lnY R IT lnY IT− − − −= α + θ + α + θ +α +α ⋅ + ν1 1 1 1      (6) 
We focus on the coefficient of the school district income tax adoption indicator interaction 
with average income. It shows the incremental variability of total school district tax revenue 
growth due to school district income tax adoption. It is denoted differently across 
specifications to highlight the distinction between effects on growth as opposed to variability 
of total school district income tax revenues. Specifically, the coefficient ² 3 in equation (4) 
captures the long-run effect whereas coefficient ±4 in equations (5) and (6) the short-run one. 
The parameter ² 3 is interpreted as the effect of adopting income taxes on the long-run 
elasticity of total school district tax revenues. The aggregate income elasticity of total school 
district tax revenues in school districts that adopted an income tax is obtained as the sum of 
² 1 and ² 3 (±1 + ±4 for (5) and (6)). This is the policy relevant parameter of interest as it shows 
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the direction and magnitude of the income tax’s influence on total school district tax revenue 
growth and variability. Standard errors are clustered at the school district level. 
4 Results 
Our long- and short-run income elasticity estimates presented in Table 3. Column (1) of 
Table 3 contains the long-run income elasticity of school district income tax revenues per 
pupil whereas columns (2) and (3) provide with the short-run ones. The DOLS long-run 
estimate in column (1) is estimated controlling for the school district income tax rate and an 
indicator for school districts that enacted an earned income tax base as opposed to the 
traditional tax base by residence. A large number of school districts are discarded in the long-
run analysis because balanced school district panels are required for DOLS estimation. Thus, 
it should be noted that the results reported in column (1) of Table 3 are based on the 22 Ohio 
school districts that did have an income tax in place in 1990. We estimate the long-run 
income elasticity of school district income tax revenues at 1.04 specifying four-year leads and 
five-year lags for the DOLS correction as shown in column (1).10 We interpret this estimate 
as evidence of a fairly stable tax base. 
The long-run income elasticity estimate indicates that school district income tax revenues 
growth tracks closely income growth. An explanation for this finding could be the fact that 
school district income taxes are proportional with very low tax rates. As a result the scope of 
the tax base is fairly constant over time. The effect of adopting an earned income tax base 
regime is cannot be estimated given the use of 4 leads for the DOLS correction because it 
only came into effect in 2006. 
Table 3 also contains two short-run income elasticity of school district income tax revenues. 
It is worth noting that, in the short run, changes to school district income tax revenues may 
come from changes in income or an adjustment toward the long-run cointegrating 
relationship. Column (2) presents our estimates using a symmetric error-correction model. 
Column (3) shows our findings from an error-correction model that examines asymmetric 
responses to disequilibria that arise when school district income tax revenues are below and 
above equilibrium levels. Our baseline short-run income elasticity of school district income 
                                                            
10  We choose four-year leads and five-year lags for the DOLS correction on the basis of the output from the 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (BIC) after evaluating 12 different models that include up to six-year lags and leads. 
Our long-run elasticity estimate is robust to the reshaping of the panel by shortening the number of time units 
to include more cross-sectional units (school districts with an income tax from the first time unit) for the 
purposes of the DOLS estimation. Restricting the sample to 1995-2008 and 1998-2008 time windows increases 
the number of included school districts to 105 and 125, giving rise to panels of 1,122 and 960 observations, 
respectively. However, the estimated long-run elasticities in the latter samples are 1.28 and 1.74. These are 
qualitatively similar to the baseline results as the magnitudes rise only modestly with a five- or six-fold increase 
in the number of observations with a less restrictive sample. 
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tax revenues is equal to 1.05 and is given in column (2).11 The coefficient of the symmetric 
ECM’s lag residual suggests that the adjustment of school district income tax revenues per 
pupil to its long-run equilibrium occurs in two years. 
Overall, we interpret these findings as evidence that the school district income tax base is 
stable and fairly insensitive to changes in income in the short-run. This suggests stability in 
revenue variability. However, as column (3) indicates school district income tax revenue is 
indeed subject to significant adjustments in the short-run. First, the substantial magnitude and 
statistical significance of the coefficient of the above long-run equilibrium tax revenue level 
indicator and income shows that downward adjustments to the long-run equilibrium are 
markedly different from upward future adjustments when revenues are above equilibrium. 
Moreover, the large magnitude of the coefficient of income (2.54) suggests substantial 
upwards adjustments of school district income tax revenue when below long-run equilibrium 
level. The even larger coefficient of the interaction term between income and the above long-
run equilibrium revenue level (− 2.69) implies the absence of any sizable short-run downward 
adjustments to the long-run equilibrium. Recall from the discussion on page 8 that the 
adjustment is equal to the combined size of the coefficients of income and its interaction term 
with the above equilibrium indicator, a mere − 0.15. The discrepancy is not surprising as the 
school district income tax revenue level at a given year is typically above its long-run 
equilibrium level because both income and income tax rates trended upwards such that the 
tax base increased net of tax rate changes.12 
Table 4 presents the results of the DID analysis of the impact of school district income tax 
adoption on total school district tax revenue per pupil growth and volatility. 
                                                            
11  Using the HP filter, we estimate short-run income elasticities that are not statistically different from zero. 
However, the R-squared indicates the HP filter specification yields inferior predictions to the primary 
specification of our analysis. 
12  School district income tax revenue levels were below long-run equilibrium levels in only a 5.25 percent of all 
school district-year observations. It should also be noted that this contrast resembles a number of reported 
elasticities in Bruce et al. (2006) from the asymmetric ECM specification where coefficients of short-run 
elasticities and speed-of-adjustment parameters alternate signs between instances of below and above long-
run equilibrium levels. The estimated long-run income elasticity for the extended sample that covers post-
2008 years up to 2015 is 0.84 which is significantly smaller to the baseline sample’s one. Restricting the 
samples to the 1995-2015 and 1998-2015 time windows, leads to an estimated long-run income elasticity of 
school district income tax revenues of 0.90 (N=1,649) and 1.01 (N=1,596), respectively. Again, these are 
comparable to the estimated long-run elasticity of 0.84 (N=315) based on the 1990-2015 sample. The 
estimated short-run income elasticity for the extended sample is substantially smaller to the baseline sample’s 
one at 0.64 for the symmetric and 1.65 for the asymmetric error-correction model specification, respectively. 
The smaller magnitudes of the estimated short-run elasticities are not a surprise but the product of automatic 
stabilizers to smoothen the phase-outs of business property taxation instituted by the state of Ohio to 
mechanically reduce school district income tax revenue volatility in the affected school districts. 
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Here, our interest lies primarily on the incremental effect of adopting a school district income 
tax on total tax revenue growth. Thus, the key parameter of interest in this exercise is the 
coefficient of the interaction term of income with the school district income tax adoption 
indicator. In the long run, school districts without an income tax in place raised 46 cents per 
extra dollar of school district income. This estimate is less than half the long-run income 
elasticity estimate of school district income tax revenues in column (1) of Table 3. The long-
run income elasticity of total tax revenues in school districts with an income tax is virtually 
the same as it does not differ in a statistically significant manner. Thus, school district income 
tax adoption has a virtually no effect on total school district tax revenue growth. In the short-
run, local tax revenues in school districts that do not adopt the school district income tax 
grow substantially more slowly than income (by 14 or 13 cents per 1 dollar of income growth 
based on the symmetric and asymmetric ECMs, respectively). Adopting an income tax has a 
trivial, positive effect on the income elasticity of total school district tax revenues. According 
to columns (3) and (2) of Table 4, it is insignificantly increased by 1 per dollar of income 
growth which is an economically non-meaningful expansion. Finally, we find that adopting 
an earned income tax base has a meaningful impact only on the short-run variability of total 
school district tax revenues.13 
Lastly, we consider how our findings compare to previous literature on sub-national income 
tax elasticity in Ohio. Relevant to our study, Bruce et al. (2006) estimate the Ohio personal 
income tax long- and short-run elasticity at 3.983 and 2.529, respectively, whereas the sales 
tax bases are much less inelastic at 1.033 in the long- and 1.802 in the short-run. Our 
estimates suggest that local income tax revenues, in the form of school district income tax, 
are much more stable to fluctuations in income both in the long- and short-run. However, the 
discrepancy of our findings with those of Bruce et al. (2006) is likely due to the progressive 
nature of the state income tax in Ohio. The latter was highly graduated from 1990 through 
2008 whereas the school district income tax and the sales tax were flat. Thus, it is not 
surprising that Bruce et al. (2006) find much larger income elasticities than our study since 
they examine a tax base with both larger rates and 8 more income tax brackets. 
                                                            
13  Only a small number of school districts enacted an earned income tax (as opposed to a traditional local 
income tax) over the course of our analysis. Thus, our test might be underpowered. Considering an extended 
sample that includes post-2008 information does not change the takeaways substantially. As Appendix Table 
A.2 shows the long-run income elasticity is 0.33 and the short-run one based on a symmetric ECM is 0.14 and 
an asymmetric ECM is 0.12 in school districts without an income tax. School district income tax adoption has a 
regressive effect on total local revenues in the long-run but not in the short-run. Specifically, total tax revenues 
grew at a slower rate in school districts that adopted an income tax. These school district income tax revenue 
losses could be attributed to the Great Recession and reduced average income across Ohio school districts in 
2009 and 2010. 
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In addition, our results are generally in-line with prior evidence of substitutability of property 
taxes with school district income taxes (Ross and Nguyen-Hoang, 2013). Looking more 
closely, we are able to tease out the long- and short-run effects of local income tax adoption 
on total local tax revenues. We find that income taxes neither affect long-run growth nor 
influence short-run total tax revenue variability. We add to the knowledge from Ross and 
Nguyen-Hoang (2013) by hinting that the extent of substitutability between the school district 
income tax and property tax bases does not differ along the time horizon. 
5 Conclusions 
A number of other studies confirm that the personal income tax can be regarded as a reliable 
revenue source in the long-run despite its cyclical variability.14 Despite the plethora of studies 
exploring revenue variability, the level of geographical aggregation of elasticity estimates has 
typically been at the state level, with only one work assessing county level data. This 
literature is, still, missing an estimate of short- and long- run elasticity of local taxes such as 
school district income taxes. Our study fills this empirical gap at the local level by estimating 
the first school district income tax elasticities. 
Our long- and short-run elasticity estimates at 1.04 and 1.05 suggest that school district 
income tax revenues did not exhibit substantial growth and variability from 1990 through 
2008, respectively. Overall, school district income tax revenues fluctuated pro-cyclically. 
Over the long-run, income tax revenues per pupil grew by approximately 1.04 dollars for 
every dollar of additional income within the school district, on average. In the short-run, 
school district income tax revenues fluctuated very mildly by 1.05 dollars. Our estimated rate 
of adjustment indicates that school district income tax revenues per pupil rebound to their 
long-run equilibrium value in about two years. Our second key finding is that school districts 
with an income tax in place experience significantly less growth in total local tax revenues in 
the long-run but not substantially different variability in the short-run. From a policy 
perspective, our DID findings highlight the substitutability between school district income tax 
and property tax revenue over time. School district income tax adoption does not lead to any 
meaningful growth in total school district tax revenues per pupil in the long run or variability 
in the short run. Thus, tax base diversification through the adoption of local income taxation 
                                                            
14  Fox and Campbell (1984) find dramatic shifts in the income elasticities of ten disaggregated Tennessee sales 
taxes and provide evidence that the sales tax is unstable using a varying elasticity, fixed coefficients model. 
Their results are also robust to a random coefficient model specification (Otsuka and Braun, 1999). Nichols and 
Tosun (2008) compare casino revenue to income and sales tax short- and long-run elasticities using DOLS and 
ECM, respectively. Felix (2008) investigates the growth and variability of five sources of state tax revenues 
from 1967 through 2007 with a particular focus on the Tenth Federal District. Wagner (2006) focuses on North 
Carolina’s composition of state revenues. Cornia and Nelson (2010) employ data from 1989 to 2009 for a 
comparative case study of revenue growth and variability of state tax portfolios. 
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is not a good idea for school financing. Our results could not be interpreted as evidence of a 
revenue-stabilizing role of the school district income tax base. 
Our estimates suggest that implementing income taxation on income earned in the school 
district does not have any meaningful effect in the long run. However, this might be the case 
because fewer than a quarter of school districts exercised this option in Ohio by 2008. This 
feature of Ohio may make our results not generalizable to a state like Pennsylvania that has 
widespread use of earned income tax bases (Strumpf, 2001). However, our estimates can 
provide useful insights for policy makers in school districts in Iowa, Maryland, or Kentucky 
that levy income taxes as a surtax or an excise tax. 
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Figure 1 Evolution of School District Income Tax Adoption and Average Rate across Ohio 
Figure 2 Covariate Imbalance before and after propensity score matching 
Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Income Tax 
Adopting School 
Districts - N = 
2,253 
    
Mean SDIT Rate 
in Surrounding 
SDs (in %)3 
0.49 0.34 0.00 1.38 
Tax Price3 0.70 0.12 0.19 0.94 
State Aid per 
Pupil (in $)2 
3,460 1,059 361 7,435 
Federal Aid per 
Pupil (in $)2 
339 240 0.59 4,888 
Percentage of 
Renters3 
20.02 7.96 1.22 56.85 
Percentage of 
Seniors3 
12.32 2.79 4.07 30.74 
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Average Adjusted 
Gross Federal 
Income (in $)1 
37,934 11,335 19,831 168,263 
Total Tax 
Revenues per 
Pupil (in $)1 
3265 1150 615 11,665 
Real Property Tax 
Revenues per 
Pupil (in $)1 
1,999 828 424 8,799 
Tangible Personal 
Property Taxes 
per Pupil (in $)1 
515 387 52 4,672 
Total SDIT 
Revenues per 
Pupil (in $)1 
751 421 0.01 3,948 
SDIT Rate (in %)1 1.04 0.46 0.50 2.00 
Income Tax Non-
Adopting School 
Districts - N = 
9,318 
    
Mean SDIT Rate 
in Surrounding 
SDs (in %)3 
0.14 0.22 0.00 1.28 
Tax Price3 0.58 0.15 0.02 0.95 
State Aid per 
Pupil (in $)2 
2885 1266 171 11,020 
Federal Aid per 
Pupil2 
355 317 0.15 3755 
Percentage of 
Renters3 
23.52 10.04 4.71 63.02 
Percentage of 
Seniors3 




39,313 19,875 16,993 371,802 
Total Tax 
Revenues per 
Pupil (in $)1 
4,105 2591 561 41,458 
Real Property Tax 
Revenues per 
Pupil (in $)1 
2660 2036 311 32,125 
Tangible Personal 
Property Taxes 
per Pupil (in $)1 
905 850 70 16,033 
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 Notes: Data covering 1990 to 2008. SDIT stands for school district income tax. Sources: 1 Ohio 
Department of Taxation, 2 Ohio Department of Education, 3Ross and Nguyen-Hoang (2013). 
Table 2 Pre- and Post-Matching Covariate Balance, Ohio School Districts 1990 - 2008 
Variables Unmatched / 
Matched 
Mean, Treated Mean, Control Var(T)/Var(C) 
Mean SDIT in 
Surrounding SDs 
U 0.42864 0.1139 2.86 
 M 0.42864 0.44868 0.97 
Tax Price U 0.66946 0.5803 0.69 
 M 0.66946 0.64947 0.92 
Tangible Personal 
Property Tax (in 
’000 $) 
U 924.44 3209.9 0.03 
 M 924.44 1023.9 1.33 
State Aid per 
Pupil (in $) 
U 3155.8 2931.4 0.65 
 M 3155.8 3180.8 0.73 
Federal Aid per 
Pupil (in $) 
U 294.09 375.57 0.47 
 M 294.09 296.48 1.10 
Percentage of 
Renters 
U 20.726 23.724 0.68 
 M 20.726 20.752 1 
Percentage of 
Seniors 
U 12.487 13.657 0.64 
 M 12.487 12.292 1.28 
Source: Ohio Department of Education, Ohio Department of Taxation 
Table 3 Long- and Short-Run Income Elasticity of School District Income Tax Revenues per 
Pupil 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 Long Run DOLS Short Run Symmetric 
ECM 
Short Run Asymmetric 
ECM 
Income 1.04*** 1.05*** 2.54** 
 (0.46) (0.24) (1.12) 
SD Income Tax Rate 1.04*** − 0.33 − 0.38* 
 (0.28) (0.21) (0.22) 
Earned Income Income 
Tax‘ 
 − 0.06 − 0.07 
  (0.14) (0.14) 
Residual Lag  − 0.53*** − 0.49*** 
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  (0.07) (0.09) 
Above 
Equilibrium⋅Income 
  − 2.69** 
   (1.12) 
Above Equilibrium 
Lag⋅Residual Lag 
  − 0.19 
   (0.17) 
Observations 198 2, 069 2, 069 
R-squared 0.65 0.43 0.44 
 Notes: Four-year leads and five-year lags of average income omitted from presentation in column 
(1). School district fixed effects are included in all specifications but not displayed to conserve space. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the school district level in (2) and (3). 
Table 4 Incremental Effect of School District Income Tax Adoption per Pupil on Total Tax 
Revenue Income Elasticity 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 Long Run DOLS Short Run Symmetric 
ECM 
Short Run Asymmetric 
ECM 
Income 0.46*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 
 (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) 
Income⋅SDIT Adoption 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.15) (0.02) (0.08) 
SDIT Adoption − 0.11 0.02** 0.02** 
 (1.54) (0.01) (0.01) 
SD Income Tax Rate 0.14* − 0.06*** − 0.06*** 
 (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) 
Earned Income Income 
Tax‘ 
 − 0.03*** − 0.03*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Lag Residual  − 0.21*** − 0.23*** 
  (0.08) (0.08) 
Above Equilibrium 
⋅Income 
  0.06 
   (0.10) 
Above Equilibrium 
Lag⋅Residual Lag 
  0.04 
   (0.04) 
Observations 1, 552 4, 766 4, 766 
R-squared 0.97 0.15 0.24 
 Notes: Four-year leads and five-year lags of average income omitted from presentation in column 
(1). School district fixed effects are included in all specifications but not displayed to conserve space. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the school district level in (2), (3). 
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Appendix A 
Table A1 1990-2015 Long-, Short-Run Income Elasticity of School District Income Tax 
Revenues per Pupil 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 Long Run DOLS Short Run Symmetric 
ECM 
Short Run Asymmetric 
ECM 
Income 0.84*** 0.64*** 1.65*** 
 (0.28) (0.11) (0.42) 
SD Income Tax Rate 0.87*** − 0.27* − 0.28* 
 (0.17) (0.14) (0.15) 
Earned Income Income 
Tax 
− 0.38 − 0.11 − 0.11 
 (0.81) (0.07) (0.08) 
Residual Lag  − 0.51*** − 0.49*** 
  (0.06) (0.08) 
Above 
Equilibrium⋅Income 
  − 1.81*** 
   (0.45) 
Above Equilibrium 
Lag⋅Residual Lag 
  − 0.04 
   (0.15) 
Observations 315 3, 153 3, 153 
R-squared 0.93 0.42 0.43 
 Notes: Four-year leads and five-year lags of average income omitted from presentation in column 
(1). School district fixed effects are included in all specifications but not displayed to conserve space. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the school district level in (2) and (3). 
Table A2 1990-2015 Incremental Effect of School District Income Tax Adoption on Total 
Tax Revenue per Pupil Income Elasticity 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 Long Run DOLS Short Run Symmetric 
ECM 
Short Run Asymmetric 
ECM 
Income 0.33*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
Income⋅SDIT Adoption − 0.04*** 0.01 − 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
SDIT Adoption 0.47 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (0.76) (0.01) (0.01) 
SD Income Tax Rate 0.11*** − 0.07*** − 0.07*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
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Earned Income Income 
Tax 
− 0.11*** − 0.03*** − 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Lag Residual  − 0.25*** − 0.29*** 
  (0.08) (0.09) 
Above Equilibrium 
⋅Income 
  0.11 
   (0.09) 
Above Equilibrium 
Lag⋅Residual Lag 
  0.08 
   (0.05) 
Observations 2, 265 4, 766 4, 766 
R-squared 0.95 0.27 0.26 
 Notes: Four-year leads and five-year lags of average income omitted from presentation in column 
(1). School district fixed effects are included in all specifications but not displayed to conserve space. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the school district level in (2), (3). 
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